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On Wednesday, May 16, 2018, the Public Integrity Bureau of the New York State Attorney General’s Office
indicted Richard Thomas.1 Thomas, the mayor of Mount Vernon, New York, faced felony charges of grand larceny
and filing false statements resulting from the alleged theft of thousands of dollars from his mayoral campaign
committee, Friends of Richard Thomas, for meals, automobile payments, and other personal expenses.2 While
Thomas eventually pled guilty to misdemeanor charges and resigned from office,3 the prosecutors’ choice to use
fraud and theft statutes rather than election law violations as the foundation for their theory of the case calls into
question the relevant election law’s usefulness as a tool to mitigate harm at all. As discussed at length in this paper,
election law prohibits the use of campaign funds for any personal use except for specifically enumerated exceptions,
and such a law seems to speak more directly to Thomas’ actions than general theft. Yet, the pertinent election law
statutes are often too vague to conduct effective prosecutions.
This paper will analyze the relevant election law statute in New York governing the personal use of campaign funds.
Using the facts of the Thomas prosecution as a case study, this analysis will highlight the vagueness inherent in the
statute’s overarching language, multiple exceptions, and rule promulgation mechanism, both in the statute’s original
form and after its revision in 2015. After noting the reasons why a more concrete standard may be desirable, the
paper will identify multiple possible solutions to the statute’s vagueness issue, including borrowing from other state
laws, conforming to a more stringent federal standard, or the institution of a series of new criminal penalties for
legislators and political candidates. The paper concludes that the latter option, combined with changes to the
existing statute based on federal standards and those of the state of Rhode Island, would be the best method of
solving the problems of New York’s law. While facing policy drawbacks and implementation obstacles of its own,
this solution seems the most likely to prevent personal use from multiple angles while creating a rigid standard for
prosecutors to engage in more effective prosecutions of violators.
THE STATUTE: ELN § 14-130 – CAMPAIGN FUNDS FOR PERSONAL USE
In New York State, Consolidated Election Law § 14-130 governs the use of political campaign funds for personal
use. On its face, the statute seems relatively clear, stating that while campaign contributions may be used for “any
lawful purpose,” such funds “shall not be converted by any person to a personal use which is unrelated to a political
campaign or the holding of a public office or party.”4 In other words, the statute allows for campaign funds to be
used in any otherwise legal fashion that is on its face related either to a political campaign or to the duties of public
office. When read closely, the statute classifies only personal uses of campaign funds “unrelated” to such ventures,
meaning that if a “personal expenditure” has at least a de minimus connection to official actions, it is allowed. This
requirement for only a tangential connection to public service seems to be reaffirmed in the statute’s definition for
what constitutes personal use. Subsection three of the statute defines personal use expenditures as those “that are
exclusively for the personal benefit of the candidate or any individual, not in connection with a political campaign or
the holding of a public office or party position.”5 As such, expenditures which a reasonable person would consider
“personal” in a general sense would not be considered “personal”6 in a legal sense under Section 14-130.
1
See Jonathan Bandler, Mount Vernon Mayor Richard Thomas to be Arraigned May 25, J. NEWS (May 16, 2018), https://www.lohud.com/
story/news/local/westchester/mount-vernon/2018/05/16/mayor-richard-thomasindicted/617302002/
2
Id.
3See Jonathan Bandler, Mount Vernon Mayor Will Resign, Pleads Guilty to Misusing Campaign Funds, J. NEWS (July 8, 2019),

https://www.lohud.com/story/news/crime/2019/07/08/mount-vernon-mayor-richard-thomas-pleads-guilty-will-resign/1672776001/.
N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(1).
ELEC. § 14-130(3) (emphasis added).
6Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines “personal” simply as “of, relating to, or affecting a particular person” with no caveat such as that seen in
New York election law. Personal, Merriam Webster’s Dictionary (New Ed. 2016)
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The “exclusivity” language in subsection three of the statute sets an extremely high standard for what constitutes a
violation, leading to what could be considered a chilling effect on prosecutions relating to personal use. Likely for
this reason, any case law regarding prosecutions for criminal violations of Section 14-130 entails fact patterns so
egregious as to leave no question that the use was entirely personal, with not even a de minimus connection to
political purposes. For example, in People v. Norman, prosecutors successfully convicted the defendant for violating
Section 14-130 after he “came into possession” of a $5,000 check payable to his re-election campaign committee
and, instead of forwarding it to the committee, “deposited the check in his personal checking account” without
notifying anyone on the campaign.7 However, explicit cases in which candidates deposit campaign funds directly
into their personal accounts without even the appearance of propriety are few and far between, and any sort of grey
area has deterred prosecutions for personal use violations. Indeed, as of January, 2019, no other cases exist citing
Section 14-130 on either Westlaw or Lexis.
In 2015, amendments to Section 14-130 attempted to alleviate confusion regarding what constituted personal use
by enumerating specific examples of expenditures that would violate the statute.8 However, these examples, a nonexhaustive list of possible violations, almost all included certain exceptions which, as multiple critics have observed,
seem large enough to swallow their respective provisions entirely.9 For example, the amended statute delineates
that campaign funds may not be used to pay for “clothing, other than items that are used in the campaign or in the
execution of the duties of public office or party position.”10 The statute, however, fails to explain what constitutes
an item “used in the campaign,” and whether or not any limit exists to such an exception. As such “business suits
for legislative sessions, tuxedos for gala benefit events, or jeans and flip flops for a fundraiser clam bake, arguably
may now be justified…”11 Likewise, the statute supposedly bars expenditures on “any residential or household
items…including mortgage, rent, or utility payments” but creates an exception for those expenditures that are
“incurred as a result of, or to facilitate, the individual’s campaign, or the execution of his or her duties…”12 In this
case, the exception once again creates even greater opportunities for abuse. As the New York City Bar points out,
this exception may grant would-be violators the ability to pay off the mortgage on their home while running a
campaign, so long as living in that home helped to “facilitate” the campaign itself.13 In the more likely alternative,
this provision may allow for certain capital expenditures on home improvement that could theoretically facilitate a
campaign such as landscaping, beautification, or repairs to a home, so long as a campaign used that home as a
fundraising location at a later date. One final example concerns “travel expenses including automobile purchases or
leases,” but makes an explicit exception for such travel-related expenditures “used for campaign purposes or in
connection with the execution of the duties” of public office, as well as personal uses “incidental” to such public
uses.14 The New York City Bar again points out certain issues with this example, including a failure to establish
“how strong the connection to the duties” must be in order to be considered legitimate, as well as a glaring failure
to define “incidental."15 This again creates a situation ripe for abuse, in which, for example, a political candidate
could theoretically use a car daily for errands and recreational trips, so long as at some point in the day that car is
used to travel to a campaign event or public office.

7People

v. Norman, 5 Misc.3d 1016(A) (N.Y. 2004)

8

“Education—Workforce Development—Appropriations.” 2015 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 56 (S. 2006-B).
9 See, e.g., New York City Bar Government Ethics & State Affairs Committee, Moving Backwards on Reform: How the
Latest Amendments to Restrictions on Personal Use of Campaign Funds may Exacerbate the Problem of Misuse (Apr. 2016).
10 N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(3)(iii).
11

NYC Bar, supra, note 8.

12 N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(3)(i).
13 See NYC Bar, supra, note 8.
144 N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(3)
154

(x). NYC Bar, supra, note 8.
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The other specially delineated provisions in subsection three of the statute include restrictions on mortgages,
rent, and utilities for non-residential properties, tuition payments, salary payments, admissions to sporting,
concert, or other entertainment events, and dues, fees, or gratuities to country clubs, health spas, or other similar
recreational facilities.16 All of these provisions have similar loopholes for “campaign” or “public office” related
expenses that create ample opportunity for abuse. In fact, the only blanket prohibitions in the statute that lack
such an exception are: (1) a complete prohibition on use of funds “to pay interest or any other finance charges
upon monies loaned to the campaign by such candidate or the spouse…”;17 and (2) “payment of any fines or
penalties assessed against the candidate pursuant to this chapter or in connection with a criminal conviction or by
the joint commission for public ethics…”18 These provisions, while clear, do not cover the vast majority of
questionable uses of campaign funds that a prosecutor might investigate and pursue. While theoretical, these
examples do not simply exist in the pages of legal memoranda. The lack of prosecutions related to Section 14-130
indicates that prosecutors in fact face similar difficulties with the provisions of the statute.
Finally, the issues inherent in Section 14-130 are further compounded by the statute’s method of addressing
borderline cases or grey areas. The statute has a built-in mechanism for addressing specific fact patterns on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis. It calls for the New York State Board of Elections to “issue advisory opinions upon
request regarding expenditures that may or may not be considered personal use of contributions.” Such opinions
are considered binding “in any subsequent civil or criminal action or proceeding or administrative proceeding.”19
Two issues arise from the reliance on these binding advisory opinions. First, the ad hoc nature of the opinions, in
which the board issues a determination based upon the submission of a novel fact pattern, leaves prosecutors a
step behind any possible violations. For example, a prosecutor must invest resources into investigation of any
possible violation of election law, requiring sometimes years of witness interviews, data analysis, and other
standard investigative techniques. If, after determining the facts of the case, the board of elections has yet to rule
on a similar matter, the prosecutor is left out in the wilderness regarding how to respond, and will likely resort to
other charges such as larceny (as occurred in the Thomas prosecution). Were a prosecutor to submit the fact
pattern to the board of elections, the delay in time between submission and publication of an opinion may impair
further pursuit of the case. Additionally, there are concerns that the publication of such an opinion, public in
nature, would notify a potential subject that he or she is under investigation.
Furthermore, the Board of Elections’ decisions themselves sometimes leave much to be desired. To date, the
board has issued only 24 such opinions since 1986.20 While this averages out to around one decision every 15
months, in reality the board’s opinions seem to occur in fits and starts. Often, the board will release multiple
opinions within a year after a hiatus of two to three years, sometimes on the same date as if the opinions had been
waiting in a queue. In one case, the board did not release an opinion for 18 years, between 1997 and 2015.21
Oftentimes, the opinions can be opaque in their recommendations. One opinion, written before the 2015
amendments to Section 14-130, grants candidates and officeholders the ability to “purchase an item from the
committee for an amount which would be equal to the market value of the item,” in which case such a purchase
would not constitute a personal use of funds.22
N.Y. ELEC. §§ 14-130(3)(ii), 14-130(3)(iv), 14-130(3)(v), 14-130(3)(vi), 14-130(3)(vii), and 14-130(3)(ix)
respectively.
16

N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(2).
N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(3)(viii).
19N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(6).
20 “New York State Board of Elections Advisory Opinions Through January 24, 2019” (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/download/law/AdvisoryOpinions.pdf
17
18

21Id.

22N.Y.

St. Bd. Elec. Adv. Op. No. 86-6 (Jul. 14, 1986).
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This opinion, of course, conflicts with the language in the amended statute, which delineates certain purchases,
so long as they have some connection to public office, as non-personal. Thus, under the newly amended statute,
a candidate could avoid having to purchase items from his or her campaign at fair market value simply by using
campaign funds to purchase the item, using the item for some campaign related activity, and keeping the item
afterward. Such an expenditure would not be considered “personal” to begin with.
More recent board opinions raise similar issues by opening additional loopholes in the statute. In one recent
opinion, for example, the board determined that a political candidate or public officeholder could dispense
leftover campaign monies to a charitable fund in which the campaign’s treasurer served as the grantor,
ostensibly allowing the candidate to use the monies for charitable gifts of his choice.23 In another, the board
adopted a rule from a recent federal court case (discussed in further detail below) allowing the use of campaign
funds to pay for childcare services so long as the candidate could not take care of the child due to campaignrelated activities.24 One can see how both of these opinions could be abused or expanded to allow for a
candidate to spend campaign monies somewhat lavishly. In the case of the former, a candidate could set up a
charitable fund in which he is the grantor and use campaign funds to donate to pet projects to which he would
otherwise have donated personal funds. Meanwhile, the latter decision allows for the possibility of future
expansion; coverage of housecleaning, laundry services, and other errands could theoretically be excused under
the theory of the advisory opinion.
SECTION 14-130’s DETERRENT EFFECT IN PRACTICE
Applying the rules of Section 14-130 to the Richard Thomas case, one can easily see why prosecutors did not
seek to indict the mayor for election law violations in addition to the existing larceny and false statement
charges. Thomas admitted to taking $12,000 dollars from his re-election campaign and over $45,000 from his
inaugural committee. He used the money for various expenses including paying off his personal credit cards,
making payments on automobile leases and home mortgages, meals and other expenses during a family vacation
to Mexico, a $6,000 tuition payment to NYU’s Stern School of Business, a golf outing, and a $2,000 Chanel
purse for his wife.25 While these purchases seem egregious and would certainly constitute criminal behavior
under normal larceny statutes, Mayor Thomas could have mounted a plausible defense on the facts of the case
to any criminal charges related to Section 14-130. So long as he could tie the purchases to the particular
exceptions discussed above, his behavior may not meet the reasonable doubt standard required for conviction.
For example, Thomas could argue that the payments on his automobile leases constituted legitimate campaign
expenses because he used those cars to travel to campaign events or for official city business. While the Board
of Elections has ruled that use of the car for “any purpose which is not in connection with campaigning or the
holding of public office” would have to be reimbursed by the candidate on a pro rata basis,26 the 2015
amendments to Section 14-130 effectively overrule the board’s opinion by allowing for personal uses
“incidental” to official duties.27 Whether Thomas’ use of his cars met this nebulous “incidental” threshold
would be a contested question. Similarly, just as the New York City bar commented on the question of business
See N.Y. St. Bd. Elec. Adv. Op. No. 18-02 (Jun. 25, 2018).
See N.Y. St. Bd. Elec. Adv. Op. No. 18-03 (Oct. 25, 2018).
25See Jonathan Bandler and Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, What’s in the Complaint Against Mount Vernon Mayor Richard Thomas: Rent, Car
Payments, $2K Chanel Purse, J. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/westchester/2018/03/12/ag-mount-vernon-mayor-used-money-family-trip-mexicochanel-purse-college-tuition-details-mount-verno/416888002/.
23

24
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27

N.Y. St. Bd. Elec. Adv. Op. No. 86-4 (Jun. 2, 1986).
See N.Y. ELEC. § 14-130(3)(x), supra note 14; NYC Bar supra note 8.
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suits (later retained for personal use) constituting a necessary campaign expenditure allowed by the statutory
exception, Thomas could make a plausible argument that the Chanel handbag he purchased for his wife would
constitute the same sort of expenditure: Thomas’ wife could have “needed” the bag, which she later would
keep, for black-tie fundraisers and charity events. As noted above, Section 14-130 also allows exceptions for
tuition payments and fees at recreational facilities so long as they are related to the holding of public office or,
in the latter case, a specific campaign event. Thomas could argue that his coursework at NYU effectively
contributed to the managerial experience necessary for his mayoral duties, and his golf outing, which he entitled
the “Mayor Richard Thomas Inaugural Golf Outing,”28 could also be covered as a pseudo-legitimate campaign
event.
While these arguments may be factually untrue and would likely not convince a jury, the question remains of
whether or not they are legally sound, and it seems that legal question is enough to deter prosecutors from
bringing charges under Section 14-130 for all but the most clear-cut cases. Furthermore, had the facts of the
case been different, had Mayor Thomas used the money to buy luxury items for himself instead of is wife that
he later used at a series of black-tie campaign events, had Thomas vacationed not in Mexico but in
Washington, D.C., where he also a spoke at a campaign fundraiser, had he paid not for mortgages but for a
new pool cover and landscaping at his house, in which he later held a minor fundraising event, it is quite
possible that prosecutors would fail to meet the legal threshold for conviction under the current statute.
More generally, one can understand a multitude of reasons why the vagueness and laxity of New York’s
personal use statute might become cause for concern. While the Attorney General’s Office and large county
prosecutors such as the New York County District Attorney have the resources and funding to invest in major
investigations, even their personnel are limited, and they would likely rather bring charges they know have a
high chance of success. In prosecutors’ offices with fewer staff members, less funding, and possibly a
proportionately higher number of cases relative to their resources, many of which exist in Upstate New York,
such issues are compounded. With such a high number of loopholes in Section 14-130, such offices would
likely spend their limited time on matters in which they can more easily prove the requisite legal elements for
conviction.
This possible deterrent on election law prosecutions, can have secondary spillover effects in the non-legal
realm as well. A lack of effective prosecutions for corrupt behavior for elected officials can lead to a lack of
public confidence in both the elected official and the prosecutors. For the former, a failure to adequately
convict corrupt politicians for election law violations when they occur can lead to a public perception of
politicians as generally being corrupt. On the other hand, the public may view prosecutors as toothless or inept,
or even as focusing on low-level street crime while failing to hold white collar offenders and public officials to
the same standard of justice. One can observe this decay of public trust occur in real time as the press
publishes stories highlighting multiple former politicians who have exploited the election law for personal gain
long after leaving office, all the while escaping prosecution.29
and Fitz-Gibbon, supra, note 25.
e.g., Mike McIntire, Retired Politicians Spend Unused Campaign Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/02/24/nyregion/24retire.html. The article highlights, for example: Judge Eric Vitaliano, a former Staten
Island assemblyman who gave $92,000 from his campaign “to a nonprofit charity…headed by his wife”; Roy Goodman, the
public overseer of the United Nations complex in Manhattan, who spent “tens of thousands of leftover contributions on club
dues, parties, and gifts” including a $2,257 lunch with former ambassador to the United Nations (and later National Security
Advisor) John Bolton; and Howard Mills, the New York state insurance superintendent who used campaign contributions for
“monthly $588 car payments…cellphone bills and…gifts.”
28 Bandler
29 See,
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE ISSUES INHERENT IN SECTION 14-130
As shown above, New York’s current statutory regime and accompanying advisory opinions create a legal
weave akin to a macramé, in which the statute’s loopholes exist as a commanding presence in the overall fabric.
Multiple alternative frameworks exist that may remedy the issues of laxity and vagueness inherent in the New
York law. This section will survey personal use statutes in select states, analyze the federal statute regarding
personal expenditures, and explore a novel criminal mechanism for circumventing the issues in the New York
law.
Alternative State Rules
Despite the issues in Section 14-130 that have been discussed at length above, New York’s statute governing
personal use of campaign funds remains one of the most robust in the nation when including the subsequent
election board advisory opinions. Nevertheless, it is worth noting certain other language that states have used
in an attempt to curb personal use and determining whether such language would cure the issues in the New
York law. A proposed law in Mississippi attempts to create a bright line for what constitutes personal use by
defining a personal expenditure as one for which a candidate or public officeholder “would be required to
treat the amount of the expenditure as gross income under Section 61 of the [federal] Internal Revenue
Code…”30 The code defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived,”31 and relevant case
law has described income as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete
dominion.”32 Because such accessions can include intangible benefits33 such as those identified in the
examples provided by Section 14-130(3), this definition would theoretically eliminate many of the loopholes
discussed above by distinguishing any incidental personal gain from legitimate campaign expenditures.
Nevertheless, framing personal use in this way must contend with the numerous exemptions from gross
income in the internal revenue code. For example, the code notes that “gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.”34 As noted by the Second Circuit in a
decision contemporaneous with the passage of New York’s personal use prohibition, if a donor intends for
their donation to be a gift for the candidate, the candidate’s personal use of such money would not be
considered income under the code.35 As such, Mississippi’s proposed approach misses the mark.
Virginia has also recently proposed a law banning personal use of campaign funds that uses different language
than that of Section 14-130, defining a “personal use” as one with a “strictly personal purpose that has no
intended, reasonable, or foreseeable benefit to the candidate’s campaign or public office.”36 This language
seems even more problematic than Section 14-130, in that it explicitly allows personal expenditures so long as
they have a “foreseeable” use related to campaigning for public office, opportunity comes to fruition.
30 Miss.

S.B. No. 2590 (Reg. Sess. 2017).
26 U.S.C. § 61(a).
32 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 477 (1955).
33 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
34 26 U.S.C. § 102(a).
35 See United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 406 (1985) (noting that many individuals may intend their contributions to be
outright gifts, and that such contributions could be made with the “detached and disinterested generosity” necessary to
exempt them from income under the internal revenue code).
31

36

Va. H.B. No. 1699 (Jan. 9, 2019).
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Similarly, Utah’s recently amended statute prohibiting personal use defines “personal use expenditure” as one
which “primarily furthers a personal interest of a candidate or officeholder or a candidate’s or officeholder’s
family…”37 Of course, the term “primarily” creates the same sort of uncertainty as words such as
“incidental” in Section 14-130. Utah’s law also does not include criminal sanctions, but rather creates an
administrative, investigative and adjudicatory mechanism spearheaded by the state’s lieutenant governor.38
From a prosecutorial perspective, this would likely not be acceptable.
Of the states surveyed by this author, Rhode Island seems to exist as the best model for augmenting Section
14-130. The Rhode Island personal use prohibition has a highly stringent definition of what constitutes
personal expenditures. Rather than characterizing personal uses as those “exclusively” for personal benefit as
New York does, Rhode Island states simply that “personal use” constitutes “any use other than expenditures
related to gaining or holding public office” and combines that definition with the “gross income” provision
previously mentioned in Mississippi’s proposed bill.39 While the inclusion of gross income in the definition
opens up the “gift” loophole described by the Second Circuit, any such funds are otherwise barred from
personal disbursement by the other prong of the definition. Rhode Island, like New York, also includes
examples in its statute, but unlike New York, Rhode Island’s statute does not include the large loophole
exceptions that have concerned prosecutors, journalists, and legal analysts. For example, while Section 14-130
allows for tuition payments if they are connected with the exercise of public duties, Rhode Island’s law bars
such payments completely. The law similarly outlaws the sort of capital expenditures on property theoretically
allowed in New York, as well as any clothing “other than items of de minimus value.”40 For this reason, the
statute does not become vulnerable to the exploitation of legal loopholes and avoids the laxity of Section
14-130. The Rhode Island statute evades the issue of vagueness as well by specifically delineating reasonable
carveouts for expenditures such as “office expenses and equipment…directly attributable to the campaign or
the officeholder’s duties,” “donations to charitable organizations, provided the candidate or officeholder does
not personally benefit,” and nominal gifts to individuals who are not members of the public official’s family,
and meal and travel expenses. For the latter, the statute explicitly notes that any proportion of travel
involving “personal activities” constitutes personal use, and those “incremental expenses” must be
reimbursed within 30 days.41 These provisions, when taken together, highlight how the Rhode Island law
creates a much more robust system of protections against illegitimate personal uses of campaign funds.
The Federal System
Many of the examples of legitimate and illegitimate uses presented in the Rhode Island law come directly
from federal election laws governing personal use for candidates. Federal law defines “personal use” as “any
use of funds…to fulfill a commitment, obligation or expense of any person that would exist irrespective of the
candidate’s campaign or responsibilities as a federal officeholder.”42 This “irrespective” test places caveats
on many of the federal law’s direct prohibitions, but these exceptions are far more circumscribed
37
38

U.C.A. 1953 § 20A-11-104(1)(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
U.C.A.
1953 § 20A-11-104(3).
39 R.I. Gen. L. § 17-25-7.2(a).
40 R.I. Gen. L. § 17-25-7.2(b).
41 R.I. Gen. L. § 17-25-7.2(c).
42 Federal Election Commission, “Help for Candidates
and Committees – Personal Use,” https://www.fec.gov/
help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/
personal-use/ (emphasis added).
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than those in New York. Examples of expenditures that pass the “irrespective test” include “cremation and
burial expenses for a candidate or campaign worker whose death arises out of, or in the course of, campaign
activity” because such a death would not have occurred were it not for the campaign existing.43 Similarly,
while the federal law expressly bans any sort of capital expenditure or home improvement, “the Commission
has allowed the use of campaign funds to pay for home security enhancements made in response to threats to
an officeholder’s safety,” as such threats stemmed from increased scrutiny that would not have existed had the
officeholder remained a private citizen.44
Most recently, the FEC approved a New York congressional candidate’s use of campaign funds for
“childcare expenses…incurred” while a candidate campaigned, noting that such childcare would not be
necessary had the campaign never existed.45 As noted above, the New York State Board of Elections was
quick to follow the FEC’s lead on the subject of childcare, issuing an advisory opinion to the same effect.
While it is unsurprising that childcare services would be permitted as legitimate uses of campaign funds under
New York law, its allowance under the federal “irrespective” test raises questions about the test’s
interpretation. After all, the congressional candidate’s children would exist, and would need to be taken care
of, regardless of whether she ran for Congress. Although the administrative officials overseeing the childcare
case made sure to note they were not reading a blanket “carveout” for childcare into federal election statutes,
this arguably novel interpretation of the “irrespective” test nonetheless leaves the door open at the federal
level for increased allowances reminiscent of those in New York. Nevertheless, the FEC’s specific provisions
represent overall the level of scrutiny prosecutors would desire in a New York statute. For example, the FEC
generally bars all capital expenditures on real property (barring exceptions for home security noted above),
bars all tuition payments and any gifts to family members at even a nominal level, and bars expenditures on
all clothing except that of only a nominal value directly related to a campaign such as a “tee shirt or baseball
cap” emblazoned with a candidate’s slogan46 – a far cry from a $2,000 Chanel handbag.
New Criminal Statutes as a Solution to the Problems Arising from Section 14-130
The third option for solving the problems of vagueness and laxity arising in New York’s personal use statutes
is a combination of new criminal statutes that effectively avoid the need to amend the law by making it easier
to prosecute would-be violators for other crimes. Such a scheme would involve an elevated form of false
filing concerning public officials and political candidates, combined with a new mandatory transparency
statute imposing an obligation on public officials and candidates to publish and disclose all disbursements of
campaign funds.
Currently, New York criminalizes offering a false instrument for filing in both the first degree, a class E
felony, and the second degree, a class A misdemeanor.47 Both crimes entail a scienter requirement as a
necessary element for conviction. For false filing in the first degree, a violator must both “know” that an
instrument is false and “intend” to defraud the state.48 For the second degree crime, a violator must simply
Id.
Id.
Maegan Vazquez, FEC Approves NY Candidate’s Request to Use Campaign Funds for Childcare, CNN (May 10, 2018),
https://www-m.cnn.com/2018/05/10/politics/federal-election-commission-liuba-grechen-shirley-childcare/
index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.
46 See FEC, supra note 42.
47 N.Y. Pen. §§ 175.30, 175.35.
48 N.Y. Pen. § 175.35.
43

44
45
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both “know” that the instrument contains false information and either know or believe that the
instrument will “become a part of the records of such public office or public servant.”49 The proposed
change to the law would eliminate these scienter requirements if the person in question is a public
servant or political candidate. That is, instead of an intent to defraud the state, the new law would find
guilt for public officers and politicians so long as they knew the instrument was false and filed it for any
reason. Such a law, by itself, would greatly deter personal use violations without having to change the
election law. Any written record in which a candidate claimed that an expenditure was for a primarily
political purpose, but which in fact related to personal use, would violate such a statute.
This novel false filing statute would act in combination with a new law mandating specific public disclosure
of all monetary disbursements from a campaign committee. Under the current disclosure laws, campaigns
must report all expenditures by dollar amount, including the name and address of the recipient and the date
of the expenditure. The disclosure must also “clearly state the purpose of the expenditure.”50 However,
such “clear statements” often lack specificity, and a campaign can simply summarize disbursements with
general labels such as “consulting,” “grassroots outreach,” or “fundraising.” A law mandating greater
specificity in disclosure would expose expenditures that fall questionably into the loopholes of Section
14-130 and place such payments under the scrutiny of both prosecutors and the public.
Such a scheme, however, faces multiple policy obstacles. First, the removal of scienter requirements and the
heightened specificity of disclosure may create unwanted adverse effects by deterring political novices or
those ignorant of the law from running for office. Individuals may choose not to challenge incumbent
politicians due to concerns that they may fail to accurately report expenditures and face criminal
prosecution. This deterrent effect would theoretically increase the strength of political incumbents and ossify
the political system by removing the threat of challengers who may have novel policy proposals but who
lack political and legal expertise. This concern, while valid, is likely outweighed by the benefits of preventing
illegitimate personal uses of funds. The lowered scienter requirement for false filings would not eliminate the
need for a violator to know an instrument contained false information. It would simply remove the intent
requirement at the point of filing. In other words, even under the heightened scrutiny proposed above,
politicians and political candidates would still have to knowingly file a false statement. Only their intent to
defraud would be irrelevant. This framing actually coincides with public policy goals. Politicians, after all,
should not lie, regardless of their intention, and the lowered scienter requirement for false filing comports
with the standards to which public officials should generally be held.
Another issue regarding the statutory scheme proposed above, and for any changes to New York’s personal
use laws, concerns the obstacle of legislative paralysis. State lawmakers may be hesitant to criminalize
behavior they could have previously engaged in themselves, and they have no incentive to place themselves
49
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under greater legal scrutiny. Nevertheless, such an obstacle does not negate the necessity of changes to the
personal use laws. In fact, it highlights the necessity of such changes to allow prosecutors to better regulate
the actions of corrupt legislators.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis above, a multi-pronged approach seems the most promising for fixing the problems
inherent in Section 14-130 as currently written. By amending the language of the statute, New York could
close the loopholes provided by the various exceptions enumerated in the law and minimize the need for ad
hoc decisions by the State Board of Elections. In doing so, it would solve both the laxity and vagueness
issues that have deterred prosecutors from acting on personal use violations. New York should thus
comport the language of Section 14-130 to reflect the more stringent standards presented in Rhode Island’s
personal use statute. Although many of the examples of allowed and disallowed expenditures in the Rhode
Island law draw directly from federal statutes, New York should not adopt the “irrespective” test in the
federal law. Such a test, in combination with the State Board of Election’s history of leniency, would
provide another avenue for expansion of personal use allowances. Rather, Rhode Island’s definition of
“personal use” as “any” use other than those related directly to a campaign or the holding of public office
would establish a clear standard for prosecutors and politicians alike.
In conjunction with these amendments, New York should pass the statutory scheme discussed above – a
lowered scienter requirement for politicians who file false statement along with greater requirements for
specificity in campaign disclosures. While somewhat redundant once Section 14-130 is amended, these
additional statutes would ensure that a politician seeking to misuse funds for personal gain could not
attempt to misrepresent his or her spending in order to attempt to fall under the amended standards in
Section 14-130. The deterrent effect of the false filing law, combined with the inability to label spending in
a general manner, would serve to prevent public officeholders and candidates from “gaming the system.”
It should of course be noted that arguments do exist for why personal use laws should be less stringent.
Giving political candidates the ability to purchase business suits, tickets to sporting events, and MBA
degrees arguably allows those candidates to better muster fundraising dollars and perform their jobs
effectively, particularly when some candidates may be at a disadvantage because of lower socioeconomic
circumstances. Nevertheless, Section 14-130, as currently constructed, creates too large an opportunity for
such candidates to abuse the statute in the name of theoretically legitimate goals, particularly when such
candidates can reap the benefits of their campaign expenditures long after they have left office. This failure
has been put under spotlight by the press51 and is exemplified by the alleged actions of Mayor Thomas. A
new statutory framework based on the suggestions above would serve to rectify such abuse, leading to
greater public trust in both lawmakers and the prosecutors who monitor them.

51See
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